Is there a trade-off between academic research and faculty entrepreneurship? : evidence from U.S. NIH supported biomedical researchers by Czarnitzki, Dirk & Toole, Andrew A.
Dis cus si on Paper No. 09-022
Is There a Trade-Off Between Academic
Research and Faculty Entrepreneurship?
Evidence from U.S. NIH 
Supported Biomedical Researchers 
Dirk Czarnitzki and Andrew A. Toole
Dis cus si on Paper No. 09-022
Is There a Trade-Off Between Academic
Research and Faculty Entrepreneurship?
Evidence from U.S. NIH 
Supported Biomedical Researchers 
Dirk Czarnitzki and Andrew A. Toole
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp09022.pdf
 Non-technical Summary 
This paper contributes to the debate whether academic scientists benefit from industry 
experience with respect to their academic research productivity as measured by publication 
outcome.  One strand of the literature argues that university faculty members who found or 
join firms may actually become more productive in terms of the quantity and quality of their 
publications.  Although the underlying mechanisms remain unclear, these entrepreneurial 
faculty members may be leveraging private sector sources for additional research funding, 
expanded laboratory facilities, or larger research teams. 
Another strand of the literature takes the opposite perspective and argues that 
university faculty members who found or join firms trade-off academic research productivity.  
This alternative perspective draws on both firm-level and individual-level arguments.  At the 
firm-level, several empirical studies identify a trade-off between a firm’s science-orientation 
and its innovative performance.  These studies cast doubt on the belief that cutting-edge 
research aimed at extending scientific knowledge can be fruitfully pursued in the for-profit 
sector, at least in the longer term.  At the individual-level, a faculty member’s choice to found 
or join a for-profit firm obligates him or her to perform many new and varied 
commercialization activities.  It is argued that these activities divert significant time and 
cognitive efforts away from research aimed at extending public scientific knowledge and 
impose a cost on academic knowledge accumulation in the not-for-profit research sector. 
Using a long panel of NIH supported U.S. biomedical scientists, we find that 
academic scientists who eventually choose to commercialize their research results are more 
productive during their career in academe than a randomly selected control group. At the 
point in time when the scientists choose to leave academe, however, their publication record 
drops. We break the scientists into three groups after their initial commercialization decision: 
academic entrepreneurs that do not return to academe, others that either leave only partly to 
 industry or return after gathering some industry experience, and those where we were not 
able to surely determine their career status after their initial commercialization choice. This 
yields interesting insights. Academic entrepreneurs never achieve as high publication records 
as they did before commercializing. However, the scientists that leave only partly or return to 
academe, perform equally well as scientists from the control group that did not 
commercialize. The other groups that leave permanent or where the status remains unknown 
publish less than the control group while or after commercializing.  
 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
Diese Studie untersucht, wie sich die Produktivität von Wissenschaftlern an 
Universitäten durch Erfahrungen aktiver Mitarbeit in Firmen verändert. Die Produktivität 
wird dabei durch Publikationen in referierten Fachzeitschriften gemessen. Die Literatur zum 
Thema argumentiert einerseits, dass Erfahrungen aus der Wirtschaft zu einem akademischen 
Produktivitätszuwachs im Hinblick auf Anzahl der Publikationen und deren Qualität führen 
können. Während die genauen Mechanismen dabei nicht eindeutig belegt sind, könnte ein 
Grund sein, dass ein Wissenschaftler durch Tätigkeiten in der Privatwirtschaft mehr 
Forschungsmittel zur Verfügung hat und diese auch effizient einsetzt, z.B. zum Ausbau der 
eigenen Forschungsgruppe im Hinblick auf Personal und Ausstattung. 
Andererseits gibt es Studien, die eine gegenteilige Meinung vertreten. 
Wissenschaftler, die eine Firma gründen oder die Hochschulen (teilweise oder permanent) 
verlassen, sehen sich einem „trade-off“ zwischen privatwirtschaftlicher und akademischer 
Produktivität gegenüber. Diese konkurrierende Sichtweise wurde in empirischen Studien 
sowohl auf der Firmen- als auch auf der Personenebene belegt. Auf der Firmenebene stehen 
sich die wissenschaftliche Ausrichtung des Unternehmens und der (kurzfristige) 
Innovationserfolg entgegen. Diese Studien bezweifeln, dass „State of the Art“ 
Grundlagenforschung in der Privatwirtschaft – zumindest langfristig - ebenso erfolgreich wie 
in Hochschulen betrieben werden kann. Auf der Personenebene wird der zeitliche „trade-off“ 
zwischen Forschungs- und verschiedenen Managementtätigkeiten diskutiert. Es wird 
argumentiert, dass letztere signifikante Zeit des Wissenschaftlers sowie kognitive 
Anstrengungen erfordern, die von fundamentaler Forschungsaktivität ablenken. 
Unter Verwendung einer Längsschnittdatenbank amerikanischer Wissenschaftler im 
Feld der Biowissenschaften zeigt sich, dass Professoren, die ihre Forschungsergebnisse an 
 einem späteren Zeitpunkt ihrer Karriere kommerzialisieren, produktiver sind als eine zufällig 
gezogene Kontrollgruppe von Professoren, die ihre Forschung nicht kommerzialisieren. 
Zum Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung, die Hochschulen zwecks einer Karriere in der 
Industrie zu verlassen, sinkt die Publikationsproduktivität erwartungsgemäß. Jedoch zeigt 
sich auch, dass jene Wissenschaftler, die später an eine Hochschule zurückkehren nicht 
produktiver sind als zuvor. Stattdessen trifft das Gegenteil zu. Während die akademischen 
Unternehmer in ihrer Zeit an der Universität vor der Kommerzialisierungsentscheidung 
produktiver waren als eine Kontrollgruppe von anderen Professoren, erreichen sie nach ihrer 
Rückkehr kein vergleichbares Niveau. Die Produktivität unterscheidet sich nicht mehr 
signifikant von der Kontrollgruppe. 
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Abstract 
Is there a trade-off of scholarly research productivity when faculty members 
found or join for-profit firms?  This paper offers an empirical examination of this 
question for a subpopulation of biomedical academic scientists who received 
research funding from the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH).  In this 
study, we are able to distinguish between permanent versus temporary 
employment transitions by entrepreneurial faculty members and examine how 
their journal article publication rates change using individual-level panel data.  
We find that the biomedical scientists who eventually choose to found or join a 
for-profit firm were more productive during their careers in academe than a 
randomly selected control group of their NIH peers.  When they pursue 
entrepreneurship in the private sector, however, their scholarly productivity falls.  
Those entrepreneurial faculty members who return to academe are not as 
productive as they were before their entrepreneurial experience in terms of 
journal publications.   
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benefited from financial support by the Marian Ewing Kauffman Foundation, Kansas City, and by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Cambridge. 
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1 Introduction 
How is research productivity affected when academic scientists pursue 
commercialization activities in the private sector?  There is an emerging debate in the 
scholarly literature on this question.  One strand of the literature argues that university faculty 
members who found or join firms may actually become more productive in terms of the 
quantity and quality of their publications (Zucker and Darby, 2007, Lowe and Gonzalez-
Brambila, 2007).  Although the underlying mechanisms remain unclear, these entrepreneurial 
faculty members may be leveraging private sector sources for additional research funding, 
expanded laboratory facilities, or larger research teams. 
Another strand of the literature takes the opposite perspective and argues that 
university faculty members who found or join firms trade-off academic research productivity.  
This alternative perspective draws on both firm-level and individual-level arguments.  At the 
firm-level, several empirical studies identify a trade-off between a firm’s science-orientation 
and its innovative performance (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003, Stern, 2004, Toole and 
Czarnitzki, 2008).  These studies cast doubt on the belief that cutting-edge research aimed at 
extending scientific knowledge can be fruitfully pursued in the for-profit sector, at least in the 
longer term.  At the individual-level, a faculty member’s choice to found or join a for-profit 
firm obligates him or her to perform many new and varied commercialization activities.  It is 
argued that these activities divert significant time and cognitive efforts away from research 
aimed at extending public scientific knowledge and impose a cost on academic knowledge 
accumulation in the not-for-profit research sector (Toole and Czarnitzki, 2009). 
 This paper contributes to the emerging debate by examining how permanent versus 
temporary employment transitions to for-profit firms affect individual-level academic 
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research productivity.2  Given the possibility of leveraging private sector resources, those 
academic scientists who return to the university may enjoy increased research productivity 
while those who never return may simply follow a new career path in the private sector where 
publication is less important. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section provides a brief overview 
of the prior literature examining the trade-off between faculty entrepreneurship and academic 
research productivity.  Section 3 discusses the data and shows descriptive statistics while 
section 4 presents the regression results.  Concluding remarks are in section 5.  
2 Faculty entrepreneurship and Individual-level Research Productivity 
In an early contribution to the literature, Louis et al. (1989) recognized that that the 
phrase “faculty entrepreneurship” encompasses a number of non-traditional faculty 
behaviors.  Their topology orders different entrepreneurial behaviors by the degree to which 
they are incompatible with a traditional view of the academic scientist’s role.  Building on 
their work, an alternative topology ranks the different entrepreneurial behaviors by the degree 
to which they involve the faculty member’s time, cognitive effort, and commitments to 
organizations outside the non-for-profit research environment.  Behaviors such as seeking 
external grants, disclosing inventions, and seeking patent protection appear at the low end of 
this effort-commitment spectrum.  Collaboration activities with for-profit firms for research 
or invention, consulting arrangements, or memberships on advisory boards would appear 
toward the middle of this spectrum.  Forming a new company or joining an existing for-profit 
firm would be at the high end of this spectrum since these behaviors involve significant time, 
                                                 
2 Our prior work showed an economically and statistically significant decrease in journal publications, weighted 
journal publications, and the value of research grant awards from the U.S. National Institutes of Health after 
academic biomedical scientists founded or joined firms.  In that work, however, we were unable to split our 
sample of academic entrepreneurs into those who left academic research permanently and those who returned to 
the university after a temporary excursion into the private sector. 
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cognitive effort, and external commitments.3  All of these forms of faculty entrepreneurship 
have the potential to enhance or detract from a faculty member’s scholarly productivity.  
However, behaviors at the high end of this spectrum are more likely to require a trade-off of 
academic research productivity.  In this paper, we focus on the more extreme faculty 
entrepreneurial behaviors of founding or joining a for-profit firm. 
Our literature search identified only three other empirical studies (besides our own 
prior work) that focused specifically on how founding or joining a for-profit firm affects 
academic research productivity.  The bulk of the literature is focused on whether faculty 
invention disclosures or patenting activity enhance or detract from scholarly research 
productivity.  Overall, these studies find that invention disclosures and patenting enhance and 
complement scholarly productivity.4  Consequently, there does not appear to be a costly 
trade-off of academic research productivity when faculty members engage in these forms of 
faculty entrepreneurship.  However, since invention disclosures and patenting are at the low 
end of the faculty effort and external commitment spectrum, generalizing this finding to all 
other entrepreneurial behaviors would be inappropriate.    
 Lowe and Gonzalez-Brambila (2007) is the first econometric study that examined 
how founding or joining a for-profit firm affects academic research productivity.  They 
analyzed a sample of 150 faculty entrepreneurs who founded firms between 1990 and 1999 
representing fourteen U.S. research universities and one national laboratory.  All of these 
individuals started their companies based on inventions previously disclosed to their 
institution’s technology transfer office and maintained full-time faculty appointments.  Of the 
150 faculty entrepreneurs, 77 were in engineering fields, 60 were in medicine and biology, 
and 13 were in chemistry.  
                                                 
3 In the event that an entrepreneurial faculty member decides to make a permanent transition to the for-profit 
sector, faculty entrepreneurship becomes a complete employment transition. 
4 See Breschi et al. (2008), Czarnitzki et al. (2009), Azoulay et al. (2006), and Goldfarb et al. (2009) and the 
references therein.  When patenting takes place with corporations, Czarnitzki et al. (2009) find that faculty 
patenting detracts from publications and citations. 
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To test for publication productivity differences, they defined an “entrepreneurship” 
dummy variable that took the value of zero in the years prior to the faculty member starting 
the firm and the value of one thereafter.  They combined their sample of academic 
entrepreneurs with matched control groups composed on their graduate school peers and their 
coauthor peers.  Using annual publications for the period 1970 through 2004 and a negative 
binomial regression model, they found mixed results across fields.  For engineering, the 
entrepreneurship dummy was positive and significant at a 1% level indicating that faculty 
entrepreneurs publish significantly more than the control group in the years after starting their 
firm.  For chemistry and the combined fields of medicine and biology, however, the 
entrepreneurship dummy was not significantly different from zero.  They concluded, based 
on their full sample, that “the potential cost of sacrificing academic research is not significant 
if even existent” (Lowe and Gonzalez-Brambila 2007, p. 193). 
Zucker and Darby (2007) identified a sample of 327 “star” scientists based on gene-
sequence-discovery articles published through 1989 and listed in Genbank, an international 
scientific database.  Using information from the Science Citation Index, they identified 207 
of these stars as having published with a U.S. institutional affiliation and further used the 
article’s address information provided for the “corresponding” author to allocate these 
individuals into three groups:  affiliated, linked, and untied.  Twelve of their stars were 
categorized as affiliated, which means at least one of their articles showed them as having an 
address at a private firm.  Fifty-seven of their stars were categorized as linked, which means 
at least one of their articles showed them as having a coauthor with an address at a private 
firm.  The remaining 138 stars were categorized as untied, which means that none of their 
articles showed a corresponding author who had an address at a private firm. 
Based on these data, Zucker and Darby showed descriptive statistics and regression 
results intended to examine how involvement of star scientists with private firms influenced 
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both the quantity and quality of their journal publication output.  Relative to untied stars, their 
descriptive statistics show that both affiliated and linked stars published more articles per 
year, had more citations per year, and had larger stocks of total citations.  For their regression 
analysis, they further differentiated linked stars into regionally local and non-local groups 
based on the U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis definition of functional economic areas.  For 
each of the groups of stars, the affiliated stars and the two regional groups of linked stars, 
they created time period dummy variables for articles which corresponded to when they 
observed the address information for the private firm:  before firm association, during firm 
association, and post firm association.  Using weighted regressions, they analyzed how 
articles per year and citations per year depend on these nine dummy variables with untied 
stars as the base group.  They interpreted their regression results as indicating that “the 
involvement of the stars with firms also increases their scientific research with no decrement 
or even an actual increase in its impact [based on citations]” (Zucker and Darby 2007, page 
460). 
Buenstorf (2009) examined how four indicators of entrepreneurial behavior 
influenced the quantity and quality of publications for a sample of elite German scholars who 
held director positions at the Max Planck Institute over the period 1985-2004.  The four 
indicators roughly capture the progression of faculty entrepreneurial behaviors from the low 
end to the high on the effort-commitment spectrum described above.  The entrepreneurial 
behaviors examined were:  disclosing inventions, disclosing inventions that were licensed to 
the private sector, disclosing inventions that were licensed to spin-off companies, and 
becoming a founder of a spin-off company.5  For the biomedical, chemistry, physics, and 
technology divisions of the Max Plank Institute, there were a total of 140 entrepreneurial 
directors who disclosed at least one invention in the sample period.  Of these, only 34 were 
                                                 
5 In his sample, the German scholars who were listed as founders of a spin-off did not participate in the 
operations and management of the company.  Presumably, they participated in research projects at the spin-off, 
but there is limited information about the founder’s involvement. 
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subsequently observed as spin-off founders.  As one would expect, these data suggest that 
founding a spin-off is a relatively rare event. 
Using a control group of other Max Planck directors from the same divisions who did 
not disclose any inventions, Buenstorf found that the most extreme entrepreneurial behavior, 
being a founder of a spin-off, affected academic research productivity differently than the 
other behaviors.  To model permanent productivity differences due to these alternative 
behaviors, four dummy variables were created that each took the value of zero in the years 
prior to the observed behavior and the value of one thereafter.  Using a fixed effects method, 
both with and without probability weights, the results indicate that Max Planck scholars 
significantly increased publications and citations after they disclosed at least one invention.6  
They significantly increased publications and citations after they disclosed at least one 
invention that was licensed to a private firm.  This indicator included patented inventions.  
For licensing to spin-offs, the regression results were mixed.  The coefficient estimates were 
mostly insignificant, but they were generally positive.  In contrast and most relevant to the 
current analysis, Buenstorf found that the number of publications and citations to Max Planck 
scholars significantly decreased after they became founders of a spin-off company.  
Buenstorf’s results are consistent with prior research suggesting that entrepreneurial 
behaviors on the low end of the effort-commitment spectrum are complementary to academic 
publication and citations, but his results also suggest a trade-off emerges when faculty 
members found a spin-off firm. 
                                                 
6 This paragraph summarizes his main results appearing in tables 4, 5, and 6 of Buenstorf (2009).  Table 7 
attempts to get at marginal differences between each of the entrepreneurial behaviors, but these results are 
limited by the small sample size and multicollinearity.  
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3 Data and Methods 
3.1 Database construction 
Perhaps the greatest barrier to research on the relationship between faculty 
entrepreneurship and academic research productivity is the paucity of systematic data 
identifying and tracking academic scientists as they engage in entrepreneurial behaviors.  
There are essentially two big challenges in this regard.  The first challenge is to define and 
identify the population of academic researchers.  For most countries, and this is certainly true 
for the U.S., there is no source of information that identifies the complete population of 
academic researchers, even if one focuses on a specific field and a specific point in time.  To 
address this challenge in our work, we focused on a large and interesting subpopulation:  
biomedical academic researchers in the fields of biology, chemistry, and health sciences who 
were principal investigators (PIs) on at least one research award from the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) between 1972 and 1996.  Our population of academic researchers 
contains about 61,000 individuals.  In what follows, our statistical analysis will allow 
inference for this subpopulation of academic researchers.  Any generalization beyond this 
subpopulation is not statistically legitimate because we cannot say with confidence that our 
subpopulation is representative of the larger population of all academic researchers. 
The second challenge is to observe the entrepreneurial behaviors of the academic 
researchers in the population.  Unlike patent statistics that can be obtained on electronic 
media from government agencies, there is no institution (governmental or otherwise) that 
systematically tracks the other forms of faculty entrepreneurship for the entire population, or 
even for our subpopulation of biomedical academic researchers.7  For this analysis, we would 
like to know who in the population has founded or joined a for-profit firm.  Because this is a 
                                                 
7 In principle, at least some of this information can be collected from the subset of public research institutions 
that have technology transfer offices, but this still requires negotiation about privacy issues and a survey 
instrument.  This limitation is the reason most research papers in this literature focus on a singe institution such 
as Stanford University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Max Planck, and so forth. 
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rare event, standard random sampling methods will not provide enough observations to allow 
for statistical analysis.  Following Stuart and Ding (2006), we used a case-cohort sampling 
design.  To implement this method, we used information from the U.S. Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program to obtain systematic data on academic scientists who 
founded or join for-profit firms.  These “cases” were grouped into cohorts and a stratified 
random sample was drawn from the population to form a control group for the statistical 
analysis (see Toole and Czarnitzki 2008b for more details on how the sample was obtained). 
Using the SBIR program to identify those academic scientists who found or join for-
profit firms has both advantages and disadvantages.8  The overarching advantage is that the 
SBIR program is the only public source of systematic information on new and small firms in 
the U.S. that identifies the individuals involved in the firm’s research.  Without this 
information, it would be impossible to conduct the analysis.  The second advantage is that the 
academic scientists who are leading the firm’s research have committed a non-negligible 
quantity of effort to the for-profit firm.  According to the stated SBIR guidelines, these 
individuals certified that they spent at least 51% of their time at the for-profit firm at the time 
of SBIR award and throughout the duration of the project(s).  This helps to assure us that we 
analyzing “real” efforts by academic entrepreneurs.  The main disadvantage is that the SBIR 
program is only one source of startup capital used by faculty entrepreneurs who found or join 
for-profit companies.  If entrepreneurial faculty members did not get financial support from 
the SBIR program, they will not show up in our data.  This limitation suggests we are 
undercounting the actual number of biomedical academic researchers who found or join for-
profit firms.  
To analyze how permanent versus temporary employment transitions to the private 
sector affect academic research productivity, we use a scientist-level panel database with 
                                                 
8 See Toole and Czarnitzki (2007, 2008) for more information on the SBIR program and its role in the data 
construction process.  
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information on annual journal publications for the period 1976 through 2003.  From the SBIR 
information, we identified 213 academic entrepreneurs in the NIH subpopulation who 
founded or joined a for-profit firm between 1983 and 1996.9  These individuals were 
allocated into fifteen cohorts based on the specific NIH institute that sponsored their 
academic research such as the National Cancer Institute, the National Eye Institute, and so 
forth.  Across all cohorts, we drew a total random sample of 1,500 NIH research peers from 
our population.  These individuals serve as the comparison or control group.  This group is 
composed of “traditional” NIH supported biomedical researchers who did not found or join a 
for-profit firm.10   
For the empirical analysis, we also required information on these scientists’ degree 
years, degree institutions, and journal publication histories.  We used the UMI Proquest 
Dissertation database and Internet searches to gather the degree information while the journal 
publication data were collected from the MEDLINE database using the Publication Harvester 
described in Azoulay et al. (2006).  The final sample consists of 447 biomedical academic 
scientists who received their Ph.D. or M.D. degrees between 1965 and 1991.  Seventy-seven 
of these individuals are academic entrepreneurs who founded or joined for-profit firms.11 
To determine whether the SBIR employment transitions for the academic entrepreneurs 
were permanent or temporary, we performed Internet searches based on the scientist’s name, 
affiliation, and location.  This allowed us to define three subgroups of academic 
entrepreneurs:  those who returned to the university, those who stayed in the private sector, 
and those whose subsequent employment could not be determined.  For academic 
entrepreneurs who returned to the university, we calculated their total time spent in the 
                                                 
9 The SBIR program was established in 1982 and its first awards were in 1983. 
10 Because we are analyzing a relatively rare form of faculty entrepreneurship, the likelihood that a member of 
our randomly selected control group founded or joined a for-profit firm through a non-SBIR route is extremely 
small.  
11 To date, this is the largest sample of biomedical academic researchers who founded or joined for-profit firms 
to be analyzed in the literature.  
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private sector through 2004 using their SBIR project start and end dates available online 
through the NIH Computer Retrieval of Information on Scientific Projects (CRISP) database. 
3.2 Variables and descriptive statistics 
We analyzed two measures of academic research productivity in this paper.  The first, 
journal publications per year (PUB), is a traditional measure.  The second, annual journal 
publications divided by coauthors (PUBW), is motivated by the possibility that laboratory 
size may influence the scientist’s annual number of journal publications.    
Our main explanatory variables identify academic entrepreneurs (AE) in different 
career stages using dummy variables.  An AE is an NIH supported academic biomedical 
researcher who is subsequently observed as a PI on an SBIR commercialization grant.  This is 
defined to be his or her first date of faculty entrepreneurship behavior involving the founding 
or joining of a for-profit firm.  We refer to this as the first date of their “entrepreneurial 
activity” in this paper.  The control group of randomly selected NIH research peers serves as 
the reference category.  The variable AE_IN is a dummy variable that equals one while the 
biomedical researcher is active in academe and switches to zero at the first date of his or her 
entrepreneurial activity.  Its complement, AE_OUT, is a dummy variable that equals zero 
while the scientist is active in academe and switches to one at the first date of his or her 
entrepreneurial activity and always stays equal to one from that point forward in time.   
Using the newly collected information on the current employment status of academic 
entrepreneurs, we are able to partition the AE_OUT indicator into three separate employment 
transition states:  permanently out of academe, temporarily out of academe, and unknown.  
For those AEs who never returned to academe, we define a dummy variable, AE_PERM, 
which switches from zero to one at the first date of their entrepreneurial activity.  This 
dummy variable stays equal to one for the remaining periods in our sample.  Out of the 77 
academic entrepreneurs, 25 leave academe permanently.  For those AEs who eventually 
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returned to academe, we define a dummy variable, AE_TEMP, which switches from zero to 
one at the first date of their entrepreneurial activity.  This dummy variable identifies those 
scientists who commercialized through the SBIR program once or multiple times, but kept 
either a part-time position as faculty or returned to a university after having worked in a 
company for the duration of the SBIR project.  Out of the 77 academic entrepreneurs, 28 
leave academe temporarily.  For the unknown status, we define a dummy variable, 
AE_UNKNOWN, which switches from zero to one at the first date of their entrepreneurial 
activity.  This dummy variable stays equal to one for the remaining periods in our sample.  
Our data collection efforts could not determine whether these academic entrepreneurs ever 
returned to academe or stayed in industry for the remainder of their careers.  We suspect that 
this lack of information reflects a permanent transition.  Because we are not sure, we prefer to 
keep these scientists as a separate group in the analysis.  There are 24 out of the 77 academic 
entrepreneurs in this group.  Of course, all AE variables always equal zero for the NIH 
research peers in the control group. 
Figure 1 shows the bivariate relationship between average publication counts per year 
by the different employment states.  The peer group consists of faculty members that do not 
commercialize through the SBIR program throughout the whole period 1976 to 2003. On 
average, a peer group scientist publishes 2 journal articles per year.  Academic entrepreneurs 
publish slightly more than the peer group during their careers in academe: 2.2 publications 
per year.  When academic entrepreneurs leave academe, publications drop to about 1.5 per 
year.  For those academic entrepreneurs who leave permanently, their average journal 
publications drop to one article per year.  For those academic entrepreneurs who leave 
temporarily, average journal publications per year increase to 2.4 papers.  Descriptively, it 
appears AEs who return to academe may be able to leverage their private sector experiences 
or connections to increase scholarly productivity.  For the group AEs whose current 
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employment status remains unknown, average journal publications per year is very similar to 
that of the scientists who leave permanently with 1.2 papers.  This suggests that the majority 
of persons in the unknown status never returned to academe. 
Figure 1: Average publication counts per year by career status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows a very similar picture for weighted publications per year, which are 
divided by the number of coauthors.  One interesting difference, however, is in the 
AE_TEMP status.  Compared to AE_IN in Figure 2, these academic entrepreneurs publish 
less than they did prior to the first date of their entrepreneurial activity.  This suggests that the 
increase average publications observed for those academic entrepreneurs with temporary 
employment transitions may be due to larger co-authorship networks.  
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Figure 2: Average weighted publication counts per year by career status 
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In the subsequent regression analysis we investigate whether these relationships hold, 
once we control for time effects (time dummies), age effects, and unobserved heterogeneity.  
In line with findings in the literature on life cycle productivity of scientists, we find it is 
important to control for age (see e.g. Diamond, 1986, Levin and Stephan, 1991).  Rather than 
chronological age, we use a scientist’s career age, which is defined to be the number years 
elapsed since their Ph.D. or M.D. degree.  Following Stuart and Ding (2006), we assume a 
maximum career age of thirty-five years before retirement.  Descriptive statistics of all 
variables used in the regression models are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 
Academic Entrepreneurs 
N = 1961 
Control group 
N = 8863 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PUB 1.842 2.492 0 19 2.003 2.679 0 40
PUBW 0.583 0.844 0 8.249 0.639 0.872 0 11.221
AE_IN 0.459 0.498 0 1 0 0 0 0
AE_OUT 0.540 0.498 0 1 0 0 0 0
AE_PERM 0.183 0.386 0 1 0 0 0 0
AE_TEMP 0.190 0.393 0 1 0 0 0 0
AE_UNKNOWN 0.168 0.374 0 1 0 0 0 0
CAREER AGE 16.732 8.615 1 35 15.594 8.601 1 35
Alternative specification for the combination of AE_OUT and AE_TEMP in robustness test 
AE_YEARS_OUT 1.651 3.926 0 21 0 0 0 0
AE_BACK 0.149 0.356 0 1 0 0 0 0
Note: Time dummies not presented. Sample covers the years from 1976 to 2003. 
4 Econometric Results 
4.1 Journal Publications Per Year 
Our first measure of scholarly productivity is journal publications per year.  As this is 
a positive integer variable, we estimate count data models using both a pooled Poisson quasi-
maximum likelihood (QML) estimator and a fixed-effects Poisson QML estimator.12  The 
advantage of pooled Poisson is that is does not impose the strict exogeneity assumption.  In 
the pooled models, shocks to publications at time t are allowed to influence future values of 
the explanatory variables.  Dependence over time is taken into account by clustering the 
standard errors at the individual scientist level.  However, as is well known from the 
economics of science literature, unobserved heterogeneity across researches (i.e. their innate 
research “ability”) can be a source of productivity differences.  We employ the following 
model of publications incorporating unobserved heterogeneity:13 
( ) ( )'| , expit it i i itE y x xα α β= ,       (1) 
                                                 
12 See Wooldridge (2002) for a discussion of Poisson models and estimation methods. 
13 To estimate the model, we used the QML Poisson fixed effects STATA routine by Tim Simcoe, University of 
Toronto. 
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where αi denotes the individual-specific effect.  Hence, eq. (1) disentangles the influence of 
the vector of covariates x’it from unobserved researcher-specific skills that may cause 
differences in average publication productivity.  Note that individual specific attributes of the 
professor, such as gender and field, are not included in the specification. Those are absorbed 
by the individual-specific effect as they typically do not change over time.  In the pooled 
cross-section QML estimation, we implicitly assume that αi = α0 for all i. 
The regression results for publications per year are shown in Table 2.14  Note that the 
academic entrepreneur (AE) coefficients show the difference in annual publications between 
faculty members who found or join firms and their NIH academic peers, all else constant.  
Looking at Model I, the coefficient estimate on AE_IN is positive and significant indicating 
that academic entrepreneurs publish more journal articles per year relative to their NIH peers.  
The marginal effect of AE_IN shows the academic entrepreneurs publish 23% [= exp(0.208)-
1] more papers, on average.  The coefficient estimate on AE_OUT is negative and significant 
indicating that academic entrepreneurs publish less than their NIH peers after founding or 
joining a for-profit firm.  The marginal effect of AE_OUT shows the academic entrepreneurs 
publish an average of 32% [= exp(-0.381)-1] less than their NIH peers after founding or 
joining a firm. 
Model II breaks the group academic entrepreneurs into the three different 
employment transition states:  those who stayed in the private sector permanently 
(AE_PERM), those who returned to the university (AE_TEMP), and those whose subsequent 
employment could not be determined (AE_UNKNOWN).  For those AEs who leave academe 
permanently, their publication productivity drops dramatically:  the coefficient estimate of -
0.792 represents a marginal effect of 55% less publications per year than their NIH peers in 
academe.  Interestingly, relative to their NIH peers, there is no statistically significant 
                                                 
14 We used fourteen biannual time dummies in all models for consistency.  The fixed-effects models did not 
converge with annual time dummies. 
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difference in journal publication productivity for those academic entrepreneurs who 
eventually return, as seen by looking at the results for the coefficient on AE_TEMP.  Note, 
however, that they publish less when compared to their previous performance as indicated by 
the positively significant coefficient on AE_IN.  For the academic entrepreneurs for whom we 
are uncertain about their final employment status, we find an effect similar to that of the 
permanent leavers.  On average, their publication productivity is 47% less than their NIH 
peers.   
Table 2: QML Poisson regressions on annual publication counts (N = 10,824) 
 
Pooled cross-sectional  
QML Poisson Fixed effects panel QML Poisson 
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
AE_IN 0.208 ** 0.207 **    
 (0.099)  (0.098)     
AE_OUT -0.381 ***  -0.532 ***  
 (0.145)   (0.123)   
AE_PERM  -0.792 ***   -1.040 *** 
  (0.200)    (0.230)  
AE_TEMP  0.043    -0.301 ** 
  (0.199)    (0.154)  
AE_UNKNOWN  -0.643 ***   -0.479 *** 
  (0.237)    (0.238)  
CAREER AGE  0.086 *** 0.087 *** 0.105 *** 0.106 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
(CAREER AGE)2 -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Intercept 0.011  0.010     
 (0.088)  (0.088)     
Joint significance of 14 time 
dummies χ2(14) =  19.18 χ2(14) = 19.36 χ2(14) = 19.54 χ2(14) = 19.83 
Log-Likelihood -24,920.62 -24,800.76 -16,641.84 -16,602.87 
McFadden R2 0.022 0.027 0.347 0.349 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). 
The career age variables are also highly significant in the regressions, and yield an 
inverse u-shape as expected based on the existing literature studying scientists’ life cycle 
productivity.  In terms of publication counts per year, the average profile suggests an NIH 
supported biomedical researcher’s productivity peaks at 21 years after obtaining a Ph.D. or 
M.D. degree, all else constant. 
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We conducted further robustness checks on the pooled cross-sectional models. The 
life cycle productivity literature suggests that academic productivity may also be affected by 
cohort effects in addition to time and age effects (see, for instance, the discussion in Hall et 
al., 2007). We tested this by the inclusion of five cohort dummies based on the scientists’ 
degree year, but these variables were always jointly insignificant. Therefore, we omit a 
detailed presentation. Furthermore, we added several other scientist characteristics, such as 
gender, degree type (Ph.D. or M.D.), degree obtained at public vs. private institution, degree 
field (biology, chemistry, or health sciences), degree obtained with the U.S. vs. foreign 
institution (see e.g. Toole and Czarnitzki, 2008, for a detailed description).  Including these 
covariates did not significantly affect the results discussed above.  For this reason, and the 
fact that all these characteristics are time-constant and drop out of the fixed effects panel 
regressions, we also omit a detailed presentation of these results.  
The fixed effects QML Poisson regression results for annual journal publications are 
presented in rightmost columns of Table 2.  In these models, the interpretation of the 
coefficient estimates is different than in the pooled models.  The AE coefficients now 
measure the within scientist change in annual journal publications.  The explanatory variable 
AE_IN does not appear in these models because it would be perfectly collinear with 
AE_OUT, its complement.  Looking at Model III, the coefficient estimate on AE_OUT is 
negative and significant.  After faculty entrepreneurs found or join for-profit firms, their 
journal publication productivity drops 40% relative to its pre-entrepreneurship level. 
Model IV breaks the group academic entrepreneurs into the three different career 
patterns.  For those scientists who leave academe permanently, their publication productivity 
drops dramatically:  the coefficient estimate of -1.040 represents a marginal effect of 61% 
less publications per year relative to their productivity in academe.  Those academic 
entrepreneurs who eventually return to academe also have significantly lower scholarly 
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productivity after their experience founding or working at a for-profit firm.  The coefficient 
estimate on AE_TEMP implies their average annual journal publications fall by 20%.  Even 
with this fall in productivity, the pooled cross-sectional results described above indicated 
these scientists publish as well as their non-entrepreneurial NIH peers after their 
entrepreneurial experience.  The journal publication productivity for those academic 
entrepreneurs whose ultimate employment is unknown drops by 37%. 
When controlling for scientist-specific effects, the estimated career publication peak 
is slightly longer than in the pooled cross-sectional models, 25 career years rather than 21 
years. Furthermore, a test on the presence of scientist-specific effects clearly rejects the 
assumption that αi = α0 for all i.  This can also be seen easily in McFadden’s R2 measures 
presented in the tables. It jumps from 0.01 in the pooled cross-sectional models to 0.15 in the 
panel models. 
4.2 Weighted Journal Publications Per Year 
Our second measure of scholarly productivity is journal publications per year divided 
by the number of coauthors.  Aside from this change in the dependent variable, the model 
specifications we examined are the same as above.  To accommodate the new “fractional 
count” dependent variable, we estimated Tobit models where we consider zero publications 
as left censoring of the distribution.  In the pooled cross-sectional model, we again calculated 
clustered standard errors which account for the panel structure of the data by allowing the 
error terms of the same scientist’s observations in different periods to be correlated.  For the 
panel model, we estimated a random effects Tobit model accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity, such that  
* '
0it it i ity xβ β μ ε= + + + ,       (2) 
where μi refers to the scientist-specific effect and εit to the random error term (see e.g. 
Wooldridge, 2002, for technical details). We observe 
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* '
0if 0
0 otherwise
it it i it
it
y x
y
β β μ ε⎧ + + + >= ⎨⎩
,      (3) 
Note that there is no consistent Tobit fixed effects panel maximum likelihood 
estimator (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Table 3 displays the regression results.  
Since the qualitative results described above continue to hold, we will not repeat a detailed 
discussion of these findings.   
Table 3: Tobit models on weighted publication counts by number of co-authors (N = 10,824) 
 
Pooled cross-sectional  
Tobit Random effects panel Tobit 
Variable Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII 
AE_IN 0.209 ** 0.207 **    
 (0.096)  (0.096)     
AE_OUT -0.417 ***  -0.514 ***  
 (0.127)   (0.049)   
AE_PERM  -0.762 ***   -0.945 *** 
  (0.144)    (0.082)  
AE_TEMP  0.018    -0.222 *** 
  (0.194)    (0.081)  
AE_UNKNOWN  -0.592 ***   -0.456 *** 
  (0.223)    (0.089)  
CAREER AGE  0.079 *** 0.079 *** 0.072 *** 0.071 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.007)  
(CAREER AGE)2 -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 0.007 *** -0.002 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Intercept -0.143 * -0.141 * -0.101  -0.108  
 (0.086)  (0.085)  (0.080)  (0.081)  
Joint significance of 14 time 
dummies χ2(14) = 16.22 χ2(14) = 16.33 χ2(14) = 14.87 χ2(14) = 14.57 
Log-Likelihood -14,128.66 -14,093.11 -12,167.05 -12,145.55 
McFadden R2 0.011 0.013 0.148 0.150 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). 
It is noteworthy, however, that all the multivariate regression results show that 
scholarly productivity falls for those biomedical scientists who return to academe after 
founding or joining a for-profit firm.  The simple descriptive statistics suggested the opposite 
effect, but it does not hold up when career age and scientist unobserved heterogeneity are 
taken into account.  Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to observe the post-
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commercialization activities of these individuals, but the results imply that the experience of 
founding or joining a for-profit firm has a lasting influence on journal publications.  This 
must reflect some new influences on how these faculty members allocate their time, cognitive 
effort, and/or commitments. 
4.3 Robustness test:  Duration of Private Sector Experience 
An alternative to the dummy variable modeling of the employment transition is to use a 
measure of the elapsed time spent outside the non-for-profit research sector.  We calculated a 
variable called AE_YEARS_OUT that measures the cumulative number of years an academic 
entrepreneur is in the private sector.  Given the panel structure of the data, this variable 
increases by one as for each additional year outside academe.  This variable only applies to 
academic entrepreneurs whose ultimate disposition in known (by us), the AE_TEMP and 
AE_PERM groups.  For those academic entrepreneurs who return to academe, we calculated 
the aggregate duration of all their SBIR projects.  For those scientists whose switch is 
permanent, the value of the variable is the remaining time in their working careers (recall we 
assume a scientist’s working career is 35 years after the date of their advanced degree).  For 
the group of switching scientists whose disposition is unknown, we kept the original dummy 
variable formulation because we do not know if these scientists returned or not.  Finally, we 
created a new dummy variable, AE_BACK, that indicates the scientist returned to academe.  
Holding constant the time spent in the private sector, this dummy variable captures how 
publication productivity changes (before versus after) for the group of scientists who switch 
temporarily to the private sector.   
The results for both publications per year and weighted publications per year are 
presented in Table 4. Overall, the results are similar to those obtained using the dummy 
variable formulation.  The coefficient estimate for the new explanatory variable, 
AE_YEARS_OUT, is negative and significant.  To illustrate the marginal effect of this 
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continuous covariate, Figure 3 plots the expected number of journal publications based on the 
results found using the conditional fixed effects Poisson regression.  The marginal effect of 
AE_YEARS_OUT is the slope of this curve.  It shows that the loss in academic productivity is 
highest in the first years and then gradually declines over time.  
Holding constant the amount of time spent in the private sector, scholarly productivity 
declines for those AEs who return to academe after founding or joining a for-profit firm.  In 
the pooled regressions, AE_BACK is insignificant and indicates that their post-
commercialization productivity is not significantly different from their NIH peers.  However, 
since the AE_IN variable is positive and significant, they are less productive than before.  The 
panel data models confirm this result.  In those models, AE_BACK is negative and 
significant.   
Table 4: QML Poisson and Tobit regressions on publication counts (N = 10,824) 
 
Poisson  models on  
publication counts 
Tobit models on weighted 
publication counts 
Variable 
Pooled cross-
sectional model 
with clustered 
std. errors 
Fixed effects 
model with fully 
robust std. errors
Pooled cross-
sectional model 
with clustered 
std. errors 
Random-effects 
panel model 
AE_IN 0.208 **  0.211 **  
 (0.097)   (0.095)   
AE_YEARS_OUT -0.116 *** -0.161 *** -0.101 *** -0.117 *** 
 (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.009)  
AE_ BACK -0.071  -0.438 ** -0.126  -0.377 *** 
 (0.234)  (0.173)  (0.213)  (0.081)  
AE_UNKNOWN -0.658 *** -0.501 ** -0.609 *** -0.475 *** 
 (0.236)  (0.238)  (0.222)  (0.089)  
CAREER AGE  0.086 *** 0.106 *** 0.078 *** 0.070 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.238)  (0.010)  (0.008)  
(CAREER AGE)2 -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0001)  
Intercept 0.009   -0.138  -0.983  
 (0.088)   (0.086)  (0.080)  
Joint significance of 14 time 
dummies χ2(14) =  19.64 χ2(14) = 19.98 χ2(14) = 16.16 χ2(14) = 13.37 
Log-Likelihood -24,734.54 -16,505.41 -14,072.52 -12,114.48 
McFadden R2 0.029 0.352 0.015 0.152 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). 
  22
Figure 3: Expected value of publications as a function of years out of academe 
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Note: This graph shows the expected number of publications as a function of the years elapsed since exit from 
academe.  These are based on the results from the conditional fixed effects Poisson model seen in Table 4 with 
all other covariates fixed at their sample averages. The marginal effect of AE_YEARS_OUT is the slope of this 
curve. 
5 Conclusions 
Our empirical analysis of NIH supported biomedical academic scientists indicates a 
trade-off exists between the production of public scientific knowledge and faculty 
entrepreneurship when faculty members found or join a for-profit firm.  This finding is 
important for a couple of reasons.  First, to the extent that the stock of public scientific 
knowledge is a critical source of opportunities contributing to long-run economic growth, it 
suggests that many of the recent efforts to foster university technology transfer through 
faculty spin-off creation may be short-sided policy efforts that ultimately undermine long-run 
growth potential.  While the jury is still out, this possibility deserves additional research and 
policymakers at all levels should be aware of this trade-off.  Second, even though founding or 
joining a for-profit firm is among the most extreme forms of faculty entrepreneurship, the 
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number of university faculty spin-offs is growing annually based on data collected by the 
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM).  In our earlier paper (Toole and 
Czarnitzki, 2008), we argued that the aggregate loss to public scientific knowledge from 
these extreme forms of faculty entrepreneurship is substantial.  In any case, our findings 
highlight an important (yet unanswered) question:  what is the appropriate balance between 
fostering faculty spin-offs and protecting traditional faculty roles such as research and 
teaching?   
One of the unique contributions of this paper was to examine how permanent versus 
temporary employment transitions to for-profit firms affect individual-level academic 
research productivity.  For the group of NIH supported biomedical academic entrepreneurs 
(AEs) who returned to academe, we found their scholarly productivity was lower after they 
returned.  Prior to founding or joining a for-profit firm, these AEs were more productive than 
the randomly selected control group of NIH research peers, but after they returned, their 
scholarly productivity was not significantly different from the control group.  Further, when 
accounting for unobserved scientist heterogeneity using panel data methods, these returning 
AEs published significantly less than they had published prior to their entrepreneurial 
experiences.  The “fertile pasture” idea that suggests engaging with the private sector 
augments the academic scientist’s scholarly fecundity is not supported by our data.  But why 
aren’t these academic entrepreneurs who venture only temporarily into the private sector able 
to achieve the same level of scholarly productivity that they had before?  Unfortunately, our 
data are not detailed enough to answer this follow-on question.  We surmise that the AE’s 
interest in commercialization does not end upon their return to academe.  It is possible they 
still devote their time and cognitive effort to non-publication objectives and, perhaps, they 
maintain strong commitments outside the non-for-profit research sector.  In any event, better 
data are needed before we can shed more light on this issue. 
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Our findings are consistent with Buenstorf (2009) who found that both publications 
and citations fell after German scholars at the Max Planck Institute became founders of spin-
off companies.  Our findings are not consistent with Zucker and Darby (2007), however, they 
only had twelve “affiliated” star scientists who founded or joined a for-profit firm in their 
sample.  Finally, Lowe and Gonzalez-Brambila (2007) did not find any statistically 
significant change in scholarly productivity for their sample of medicine/biology and 
chemistry academic entrepreneurs.  One important aspect of their sample, however, is that all 
of their academic entrepreneurs maintained full-time positions at their universities.  Data 
limitations prevent us from knowing how involved those scientists were with their firms.  In 
contrast, from our SBIR data, we know the AEs we studied devoted significant effort to the 
firm.  Quite generally, the literature suggests that academic fields are quite different.  It could 
be seriously misleading to general our findings for NIH supported biomedical academic 
entrepreneurs to entrepreneurial faculty in other fields such as engineering. 
Without a doubt, much more research is needed to help build our understanding of the 
relationship between faculty entrepreneurship and scholarly productivity.  As was pointed out 
in the literature review section, there are a spectrum of faculty entrepreneurial behaviors that 
differ in the degree to which they require a faculty member’s time, cognitive effort, and his or 
her commitment to stakeholders outside the not-for-profit research sector.  More theoretical 
and empirical work is needed to help delineate these behaviors.  It almost goes without saying 
that our measures of scholarly productivity are limited and, for lack of data, we could not 
include journal article citations in this analysis.  Interestingly, for faculty patenting in 
Germany, Czarnitzki et al. (2009) find that co-patenting with industry shows weak negative 
effects on publication counts, but stronger negative effects on publication quality measured 
through both journal impact factor weighted publication counts and the number of forward 
citations. Furthermore, as was pointed out in the beginning of our data section, there is a 
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serious paucity of data identifying the population of academic scientists and tracking the 
various entrepreneurial behaviors.  We rely on the U.S. SBIR program to provide systematic 
data, but this is not nearly as comprehensive as we would like.  For instance, data on the 
specific tasks performed by academic entrepreneurs at the firm along with details of their 
employment contracts would help to understand how responsibilities and commitments affect 
their allocation of time and effort across the boundary between the for-profit and not-for-
profit sectors.   
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